Pierre Saint-Germier publishes "Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?"

Philosophiques (2017) 44, pp. 49-71

11.11.2017 | Kristian Hvidtfelt Nielsen

Abstract

We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.

Link to article (open acces, in French)

Udgivelse