My research is primarily in epistemology and the philosophy of mind, with a particular focus on epistemic normativity, the nature of belief, and the norms governing inquiry. Much of my work has aimed to develop a systematic account of the relations between epistemic reasons, practical reasons, and the aims of belief and inquiry. I have also worked extensively on related issues concerning higher-order evidence, group rationality, disagreement, and pragmatic encroachment. Beyond these core topics, my research has addressed broader questions in metaphysics and decision theory, especially concerning causation, risk, and luck. Increasingly, my work also engages applied epistemology, where I bring systematic epistemological tools to bear on socially and politically significant questions concerning democracy, discrimination, privacy, informed consent, and mental disorder.

My current projects include research on the epistemology of informed consent, especially the role of ignorance and uncertainty in autonomous decision-making, and on irrational belief and emotion in mental disorder, including their significance for rationality, responsibility, and destigmatization. Across these areas, I am interested in how abstract philosophical work on belief, inquiry, and normativity can illuminate concrete human practices and problems.