If there is a gap from "is" to "ought", then how are agencies like De Økonomiske Råd relevant in political debates?

I argue that economists can scientifically supply more than hypothetical imperatives ("If you want to do X, then do Y”) because political positions carry commitments about the achievability of their ends. I argue that differential usefulness of what economists say does not imply political content. Thus, climate deniers in environmental economics can be disadvantaged by information from climate science and climate economics. Supporters of tax cuts who appeal to historical case studies to argue that these tax cuts will increase revenues can be disadvantaged by methodological evaluations of that evidence’s unreliability. Yet these disadvantaging effects do not imply political content. 

Then I apply these metaethical ideas in two contrasting case studies. First, I argue against recent philosophers who have claimed that some methodologies in development economics have special political content. Second, I show how various political views (including egalitarianism, political Marxism, conservatism, and libertarianism!) have been unfairly disadvantaged by misinterpretations of purely instrumental modelling choices in decision theory and game theory. I conclude that philosophers and historians of economics can help avoid the second type of case, through greater clarification of economists’ reasoning.

Coffee/tea, cake and fruit will be served at 13:15.