My presentation explores group epistemic responsibility in science. I focus on epistemic responsibility as an obligation to be epistemically responsible for one’s knowledge claims. I first clarify what it takes for an individual scientist to be epistemically responsible for knowledge claims, to whom epistemic responsibilities are owed, and why scientists have such responsibilities. Next, I turn to the question of whether epistemic responsibilities can be attributed to groups, if not all groups, at least some sorts of groups. I argue that collective epistemic responsibilities can only be attributed to groups that are collectives. When such a group has a collective epistemic responsibility, the challenge is to understand what collective epistemic responsibility implies for the obligations of group members. I also argue that even when a group cannot bear collective epistemic responsibilities, group members can still have group-related obligations. My aim is to find a charitable way of reinterpreting the claim that scientific communities are epistemically responsible for their views and can be called upon to defend them.

Coffee, tea, cakes and fruit will be served before the colloquium @ 2 pm.