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Pierre Saint-Germier publishes "Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?"

Philosophiques (2017) 44, pp. 49-71

Abstract

We discuss the view, accepted by many rational intuition theorists, that rational intuitions involve appearances of necessity. The fact that we can have rational intuitions of contingent propositions casts a doubt on the adequacy of this view. This fact can be accommodated by a fallibilist theory of rational intuitions, provided one accepts that these intuitions generate ineliminable modal illusions. Drawing on two-dimensional explanations of the contingent a priori, we defend an alternative view according to which the appearances involved in rational intuitions are not appearances of necessity but rather an expression of their a priori status.

Link to article (open acces, in French)